Linking network flows is an important problem in intrusion detection as well as anonymity. Passive traffic analysis can link flows, but requires long periods of observation to reduce errors. Active traffic analysis, also known as flow watermarking, allows for better precision and is more scalable. Previous flow watermarks introduce significant delays to the traffic flow as a side effect of using a blind detection scheme; this enables attacks that detect and remove the watermark, while at the same time slowing down legitimate traffic. We propose the first non-blind approach for flow watermarking, called RAINBOW, that improves watermark invisibility by inserting delays hundreds of times smaller than previous blind watermarks, hence reduces the watermark interference on network flows. We derive and analyze the optimum detectors for RAINBOW as well as the passive traffic analysis under different traffic models by using hypothesis testing. Comparing the detection performance of RAINBOW and the passive approach, we observe that both RAINBOW and passive traffic analysis perform similarly good in the case of uncorrelated traffic, however the RAINBOW detector drastically outperforms the optimum passive detector in the case of correlated network flows. This justifies the use of non-blind watermarks over passive traffic analysis even though both approaches have similar scalability constraints. We confirm our analysis by simulating the detectors and testing them against large traces of real network flows.
I. INTRODUCTION
I NTERNET attackers commonly relay their traffic through a number of (usually compromised) hosts in order to hide their identity. Detecting such hosts, called stepping stones, is therefore an important problem in computer security. The detection proceeds by finding correlated flows entering and leaving the network. Traditional approaches have used patterns inherent in traffic flows, such as packet timings, sizes, and counts, to link an incoming flow to an outgoing one [1] - [5] . More recently, an active approach called watermarking has been considered [6] - [12] . In this approach, traffic characteristics of an incoming flow are actively perturbed as they traverse some router to create a distinct pattern, which can later be recognized in outgoing flows. These techniques also have relevance to anonymous communication, as linking two flows can be used to break Manuscript received March 12, 2012 ; revised October 06, 2012 and May 28, 2013; accepted June 26, 2013; approved by IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING Editor S. Kasera. Date of publication July 31, 2013; date of current version August 14, 2014 . This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grants CNS 0831488, CCF 10-54937 CAR, and CCF 10-65022, the Boeing Trusted Software Center, Information Trust Institute, University of Illinois, and the AFOSR under Grants FA9550-11-1-0016 and FA9550-10-1-0573.
A. Houmansadr is with the University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78701 USA (e-mail: amir@cs.utexas.edu). N. Kiyavash anonymity, and both passive traffic analysis [13] , [14] and active watermarking [8] , [9] , [12] , [15] have been studied in that domain as well.
The choice between passive and active techniques for traffic analysis exhibits a tradeoff. Passive approaches require observing relatively long-lived network flows and storing or transmitting large amounts of traffic characteristics. Watermarking approaches are more efficient, with shorter observation periods necessary. They are also blind: Rather than storing or communicating traffic patterns, all the necessary information is embedded in the flow itself. This, however, comes at a cost: To ensure robustness, the watermarks introduce large delays (hundreds of milliseconds) to the flows, interfering with the activity of benign users and making them subject to attacks [16] , [17] .
Motivated by this, we propose a new category for network flow watermarks, the non-blind flow watermarks. Non-blind watermarking lies in the middle of passive techniques and (blind) watermarking techniques: Similar to passive techniques (and unlike blind watermarks), non-blind watermarks will record traffic pattern of incoming flows and correlate them with outgoing flows. On the other side, similar to blind watermarks (and unlike passive techniques), non-blind watermarking aids traffic analysis by applying some modifications to the communication patterns of the intercepted flows. We develop and prototype the first non-blind flow watermark, called RAINBOW. RAINBOW records the timing pattern of incoming flows and correlates them with the timing pattern of the outgoing flows. On each incoming flow, RAINBOW also inserts a watermark by delaying some packets, after recording the received timings. As such a watermark is generated independently of the flows, this will diminish the effect of natural similarities between two unrelated flows and allow a flow linking decision to be made over a much shorter time period. RAINBOW uses spread-spectrum techniques to make the delays much smaller than previous work. RAINBOW uses delays that are on the order of only a few milliseconds; this means that RAINBOW watermarks not only do not interfere with traffic patterns of normal users, but they are also virtually invisible since the delays are of the same magnitude as natural network jitter (watermark invisibility, as studied in previous work [10] , [18] , [19] , implies very low probability of detection through statistical analysis). In [10] , we use different information theoretical tools to verify the invisibility of RAINBOW and demonstrate its high performance in linking network flows through a prototype implementation over the PlanetLab [20] infrastructure.
In this paper, we thoroughly analyze the detection performance of RAINBOW non-blind watermark and compare it to that of passive traffic analysis schemes. By using hypothesis testing mechanisms from the detection and estimation theory [21] , we find the optimum detection schemes for RAINBOW as well as the optimum passive detectors under different models for network traffic. Modeling real-world network traffic is a complicated problem as it depends on many U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright. different parameters; as a result, we only consider two extreme models of the network traffic: 1) independent flows where each flow is modeled as a Poisson process (traffic model A), and 2) completely correlated flows where all flows are considered to have similar timing patterns (traffic model B). We assume that any real-world traffic model lies in the middle of these two extreme models. Our analysis leads to the following important conclusions.
1) Non-blind watermarking always performs a better detection than passive traffic analysis. This is an essential result in motivating the use of non-blind watermarks over passive traffic analysis since both have similar scalability constraints, i.e., both approaches have communication overheads and computation overheads [10] . Not that this point is not necessary (nor is always true) to motivate the use of traditional (blind) watermarks over passive traffic analysis, since blind watermarks provide much better scalability (i.e., communication overhead and computation overhead [10] ).
2) Our analysis shows that the performance advantage of nonblind watermarking (over passive schemes) is only marginal for uncorrelated network traffic, while it is very significant for correlated network traffic. This knowledge can be used to decide the best traffic analysis approach in various applications. We validate our analysis through simulating the detection schemes on real network traces. In particular, we show that for highly correlated traffic, e.g., same Web page downloads, passive traffic analysis performs very poorly, while a RAINBOW watermark is highly effective.
3) We also show (through both analysis and experiments)
that the optimum watermark detector derived for correlated traffic (namely SLCorr) also performs very well for uncorrelated traffic (while the optimum watermark detector for uncorrelated traffic does not do well for correlated traffic). This allows one to use SLCorr as the sole watermark detector regardless of the type of traffic being observed. This is especially useful in real-world applications where the observed traffic is a mixture of different flow types. Note that in this paper we do not discuss the performance advantage of non-blind watermarks over traditional blind watermarks, as this has been justified in [10] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review the problem of stepping stone detection and existing schemes in Section II. Our RAINBOW scheme is presented in Section III. In Section IV, we use hypothesis testing to find and analyze the optimum likelihood ratio detectors for passive and non-blind active (watermark) approaches under different traffic models and analyze their false error rates. In Section V, we validate the analysis results through simulation of the detection schemes over real network traces. We review several properties of RAINBOW in Section VI. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
Linking network flows is an important problem in different networking applications, e.g., stepping stone detection [1] , [2] . In such applications, network flows are relayed through intermediate nodes that disguise the relation between the original and the relayed flows by encrypting packet contents and modifying packet headers.
Traffic analysis is suggested as an effective tool for linking network flows in such scenarios since the intermediate nodes do not significantly modify the traffic patterns of the relayed flows. The common patterns used for traffic analysis are the packet counts, packet timings, and packet sizes.
A. Passive Traffic Analysis
In general, passive traffic analysis techniques operate by recording characteristics of incoming streams and then correlating them with the outgoing ones. The right place to do this is often at the border router of an enterprise, so the overhead of this technique is the space used to store the stream characteristics long enough to check against correlated relayed streams, and the CPU time needed to perform the correlations. In a complex enterprise with many interconnected networks, a connection relayed through a stepping stone may enter and leave the enterprise through different points; in such cases, there is additional communications overhead for transmitting traffic statistics between border routers.
The passive schemes have explored using various characteristics for correlating streams. Zhang and Paxson [2] model interactive flows as on-off processes and detect linked flows by matching up their on-off behavior. Wang et al. [3] use the interpacket delays and devise several metrics for correlating stepping stones. Blum et al. find upper bounds of evading passive analysis for an adversary with limited perturbation freedom. He and Tong correlate packet counts to detect stepping stones [22] . Coskun et al. [23] use flow sketches, short representations of network flows, for a fast but not highly effective correlation of network flows. Hu et al. [5] use neural networks for the detection of stepping stones by making the assumption that legitimate traffic do not go through more than two relays.
B. Watermarks
To address some of the efficiency concerns of passive traffic analysis, Wang et al. proposed the use of watermarks [6] . In this scenario, a border router will modify the traffic timings of the incoming flows to contain a particular pattern-the watermark. If the same pattern is present in an outgoing flow, a stepping stone is detected.
Watermarks improve upon passive traffic analysis in two ways. First, by inserting a pattern that is uncorrelated with any other flows, they can improve the detection efficiency, requiring smaller numbers of packets to be observed (hundreds instead of thousands) and providing lower false-positive rates (10 or lower, as compared to 10 with passive watermarks). Second, they can operate in a blind fashion: After an incoming flow is watermarked, there is no need to record or communicate the flow characteristics since the presence of a watermark can be detected independently. The detection is also potentially faster, as there is no need to compare each outgoing flow to all the incoming flows within the same time frame.
Wang et al. [6] were the first to propose the use of flow watermarks for detecting stepping stones. They later suggest the use of similar techniques for linking encrypted VoIP communications [15] . Several watermark suggestions [7] - [9] embed watermark modifications in intervals of network flows to resist packet-level modifications due to the noisy communication network. Such suggestions, known as interval-based watermarks, are susceptible to an attack that intercepts multiple watermarked flows [17] . SWIRL [11] makes the watermark modifications dependent on the host flow in order to resist this multiflow attack.
An effective watermark should propose some desirable properties. First of all, a watermark should be robust to modifications of the traffic characteristics that will occur inside an enterprise network, such as jitter. The watermarks should also introduce little distortion, in that they should not significantly impact the performance of the flows. This is important because in a stepping-stone scenario, most watermarked flows will be benign. Finally, watermarks should be invisible even to attackers who specifically try to test for their presence.
III. RAINBOW WATERMARK
We next present the design of a new watermark scheme we call RAINBOW, for Robust And Invisible Non-Blind Watermark. Our scheme is robust (to passive interference) and invisible. However, to achieve invisibility while maintaining detection efficiency, we make the scheme non-blind; that is, incoming flows timings are recorded and compared with the timings of outgoing flows. This allows us to make a robust watermark test with even low-amplitude watermarks.
Suppose that a flow with the packet timing information enters border router where it is to be watermarked (we use the superscript to denote an "unwatermarked" flow). Before embedding the watermark, the interpacket delays (IPDs) of the flow, are recorded in an IPD database, which is accessible by the watermark detector. The watermark is subsequently embedded by delaying the packets by an amount such that the IPD of the th watermarked packet is . The watermark components take values with equal probability (the watermarker excludes any IPD smaller than from watermarking in order to avoid negative delays). The value is chosen to be small enough so that the artificial jitter caused by watermark embedding is invisible to ordinary users and attackers. 1 In order to apply watermark delays on the flow, output packet is delayed by , where is the initial delay applied to the first packet. This results in , as desired. Since we cannot delay a packet for a negative amount of time, must be chosen large enough to prevent this from happening. Since the sequence is generated from a random seed, the watermarker can calculate all of the partial sums in advance and adjust accordingly. If a particular random seed requires a very large initial delay , a different seed can be chosen.
As the flow traverses the network, it accumulates extra delays. Let be the delay that the packet accumulates by the time it reaches the watermark detector; i.e., the packet is received at the detector at time . The IPD values at the detector are then (1) where is the jitter present in the network.
As mentioned before, the RAINBOW scheme is non-blind, and therefore the detector has access to the IPD database where the unwatermarked flows are recorded. Given an observed flow at the detector with IPDs and a previously recorded flow , the detector must decide whether the two flows are linked or not. In Section IV, we derive the optimum detectors for the RAINBOW watermarks according to the LRT rules. We also derive the optimum passive detectors, showing that the RAINBOW watermark performs significantly better than passive traffic analysis for correlated network flows.
IV. DETECTION APPROACHES
RAINBOW is the first non-blind flow watermarking scheme. Non-blind watermarking inherits similar scalability issues from the passive traffic analysis. In this section, we show how nonblind watermarking improves the traffic analysis performance as compared to the traditional passive traffic analysis.
We derive optimum likelihood ratio test (LRT) detectors for the RAINBOW watermarking scheme for different traffic models and compare its detection performance to those of optimum passive detectors. We show that RAINBOW outperforms passive traffic analysis for different traffic models; this confirms what we expect intuitively from information theory, as a non-blind watermark detector has access to more information (the watermark and the IPDs), compared to a passive detector that only has access to the IPDs. We also show that the RAINBOW detector is reliable in different models, while the optimum passive detector fails in some scenarios.
As the extreme models, we perform our detection analysis for two traffic models:
• traffic model A: independent flows with i.i.d. interpacket delays; • traffic model B: completely correlated flows. As it is infeasible to evaluate the detection performance for all different traffic models, we discuss the detection performance for these two traffic models, and consider any real-world network flow to lie between these two extreme models. We show that an active detector, i.e., RAINBOW, is reliable for different models, while a passive detector fails for certain traffic models.
A. Detection Primitives
We use hypothesis testing [21] to analyze the detection performance of active and passive detectors. For an active detector, we aim to distinguish between the two following hypotheses.
• (null hypothesis): The received flow with IPDs is a new, unwatermarked flow, unlinked to the flow with IPDs .
• : is the result of a flow with original IPDs being watermarked and passed through the network. 2 Also, for a passive detector, we consider the following hypothesis testing problem.
• (null hypothesis): The received flow with IPDs is a new flow, unlinked to (the IPDs of another received flow).
• : is the result of passing through the network. We find the optimum LRTs of these hypothesis testing problems. For any received flow with IPDs, an LRT evaluates a test metric for the IPDs, , and compares it to a detection threshold ; if , the received flow is said to be linked to the one in the detector's database (with IPDs of ). We can therefore express the false positive and false negative rates of the detector as
B. Network Jitter Model
We will model network delays as i.i.d. exponential, which implies that the jitter (difference of two delays) is i.i.d. according to a zero-mean Laplace distribution denoted by , where is the variance of the jitter. Of course, in a real network, delays will have some correlation; we compare the probability density function (pdf) of real observed jitter on a connection over PlanetLab [20] to a best-fit Laplace distribution in Fig. 1 . We can see that the real pdf has greater support at 0, and the Laplace distribution has a heavier tail. This means that our analysis of error rates will be conservative since 0 jitter will result in no error for our detection scheme. We have also conducted similar experiments with the same results on Tor anonymous network [24] to consider the other application of watermarking.
C. Traffic Model A: Independent Flows, i.i.d. IPDs
In this model, we assume that the candidate flows are independent. Also, each flow has i.i.d. IPDs, i.e., the flow is modeled with a Poisson process. This represents a good model for noninteractive network flows.
1) Passive Detection (PASSV Scheme): In this section, we find the optimum likelihood ratio (LRT) passive detector for the traffic model A. Suppose that the flow with IPDs is known to the detector. The detector will need to check if it is correlated with some received flow , where and are independent. Hence, in this case, the hypothesis testing problem is (4) where and represent the network jitter. Based on our measurements over the PlanetLab, we model the network jitter with an i.i.d. Laplacian distribution (see Section IV-B). In order to find the optimum LRT detector, we first need to find the pdf of in different hypotheses, i.e., for hypoth-esis . As the model A suggests, we model the IPDs as i.i.d. exponential distribution. So, in hypothesis the received signal is the summation of a Laplace and an exponential random variable. We have that the summation of an exponential random variable and a Laplace distribution , i.e., , is given by [25] 
We use this to find
In the case of , since the is known to the detector, we can model as a Laplacian distribution with mean . Hence (7) Note that even though the real-world IPDs can never be negative, the densities and return a nonzero density for negative values of the IPDs. In fact, this is due to the approximation we make in modeling the network jitter as a two-sided Laplacian distribution, and its effect is very small for ordinary network flows based on our simulations [10] .
Having the densities and , we derive the optimum detector based on the likelihood ratio test to be (8) where is the LRT detection threshold and (9)
We define as the normalized detection threshold. A value of of results in a MiniMax detector. Detection Performance: Let us consider the case where the detector uses the PASSV detection scheme in order to link a received flow with IPDs to a known flow with IPDs , i.e., a registered flow. Considering the assumptions made in the traffic model A, i.e., the IPDs being i.i.d., we use Lemma 1 (part b) in the Appendix to find the false positive ( ) and false negative ( ) error rates of the PASSV detector
where and
The error probabilities of and correspond to a fixed known IPDs sequence, . The overall false errors are evaluated by averaging and with respect to
We can represent the upper bounds of these false errors as (20) 
where
For each detection threshold , we find the tightest exponent bounds and such that
Analysis Results: We use Mathematica 7.0 to evaluate the false error exponents of (24) and (25) . The parameters used for the simulations are s and pps, borrowed from [10] . Fig. 2 plots the tightest bounds for the error exponents of and for different thresholds of . Note that the optimum varies with the decision threshold. For , the false positive and false negative errors are equal; we name this error rate the crossover error rate (COER). For the mentioned setting of the variables, the COER exponent of the PASSV detector is equal to 1.06396.
2) Active Detection (ACTV Scheme): In this section, we find the optimum LRT detector for the RAINBOW non-blind watermark for the traffic model A. We have the following hypothesis testing problem: (26) where 's are the IPDs registered in the IPD database, and 's are the IPDs of an independent flow. As before, in order to find the optimum LRT detector, we need to find the distribution of in different hypotheses. Using (5), we find the corresponding pdf under as Since and are known to the detector, we find the pdf in hypothesis as the following:
Thus, the optimum detector based on the likelihood ratio test is (29) where is the LRT detection threshold and (30) (31) Detection Performance: As before, considering the independence of the IPDs and also the watermark bits, we use Lemma 1 (part b) in the Appendix to find the error probabilities of the ACTV detector for a given and Analysis Results: Using Mathematica 7.0, we evaluate the false error exponents of (45) and (46). As before, we use the parameters s, s, and pps for the simulations. Fig. 3 plots the tightest bounds for the error exponents of and for different thresholds of . The COER exponent occurs for and is equal to 1.06828, which is slightly better compared to that of the PASSV detector evaluated before, i.e., 1.06396.
D. Traffic Model B: Correlated Flows, Correlated IPDs
As the other extreme of traffic models, we investigate the traffic model with correlated IPDs. We consider the case where all of the network flows have the same IPDs, e.g., for any two flows with IPDs and , we have that for all . This model captures the behavior of a number of widely used types of traffic, including bulk file transfers, browsing the same/similar Web sites, VoIP voice/video calls, video streaming, etc. In fact, as we demonstrate in this paper through analysis and simulations, passive traffic analysis is highly We call this detector SLCorr, as it is composed of a soft limiter followed by a correlation block. From a communications point of view, the soft-limiter is useful in reducing the signal detection noise in channels with a Laplacian distributed noise. We will use this as the detection scheme for the RAINBOW watermark, as will be discussed later. Fig. 4 shows the block diagram of the SLCorr detector. SLCorr is a MiniMax detector for a detection threshold of . and for different thresholds of . The COER exponent occurs for and is equal to 0.0945.
E. Discussion
Above, we derived the optimum passive and active detectors for the traffic analysis problem and evaluated their performance by finding the Chernoff upper bounds of their false error rates. In this section, we use the asymptotic relative efficiency (ARE) as a tool to compare their detection performances.
The ARE is a measure for comparing two discrete-time detection schemes. For two discrete detection schemes and , the ARE metric is defined as , where is the number of 's samples. The parameter is the smallest number of samples that results in 's error rate to be smaller than or equal to the error rate of (with samples). An ARE metric of depicts that is asymptotically more efficient than . Chernoff [26] finds the ARE metric of two detectors and using their Chernoff error upper bounds as (77) where and are the error exponents of the Chernoff upper bounds for and detectors, respectively. Using the analysis results from Sections IV-C and IV-D, we can derive the ARE metric of the optimum passive and active detectors for the two traffic models as (78) (79)
This asserts that the optimum active detector outperforms the optimum passive detector in both traffic models A and B (which is intuitively expected from information theory). As an important observation, we see that the active detector's advantage is very small for the traffic model A, however the active detector significantly outperforms the optimum passive detector in traffic model B, i.e., the correlated traffic. In other words, the active detector provides very good detection performance for different traffic models, however the passive detection is very poor for the more correlated network traffic.
In the rest of this section, we analyze the performance of the SLCorr scheme under the traffic model A, showing that even though SLCorr is not the optimum detector for the traffic model A, however it provides very good detection performance under this model. Based on this, we choose SLCorr as the sole detector for RAINBOW, regardless of the behavior of the network flows. This simplifies the watermark detection, as real-world traffic are combinations of the models A and B, and the detection can be performed regardless of the type of the received traffic. We also analyze the performance of PASSV and ACTV detectors under traffic model B, showing their inefficiency in this model.
1) SLCorr Detection Performance for Traffic Model A:
The SLCorr scheme is the optimum active detector for traffic model B, but not the traffic model A. In this section, we show that SLCorr achieves a good detection performance even under traffic model A, allowing a system designer to use it as the sole detection scheme regardless of the type of the traffic. SLCorr faces the following hypothesis testing under the traffic model A:
Considering SLCorr's detection metric, given in (60) to (62), one can rewrite the hypothesis testing problem as (81) where
. Let us assume and as the pdfs of and , respectively. We have that (82)
Also, based on the summation of two Laplace distributions given in [25] Analysis Results: We use Mathematica 7.0 to evaluate the false error exponents of (99) and (100). The parameters used for the simulations are s, pps, and s. Fig. 6 plots the tightest bounds for the error exponents of and for different thresholds of . The COER exponent occurs for s, which is equal to 0.0228. Also, Fig. 7 shows the COER exponent with respect to different values of the watermark amplitude, . As we can see, increasing the watermark amplitude improves the detection performance (but reduces the watermark invisibility as discussed in [10] ).
2) Detection Performance of PASSV and ACTV Schemes for Traffic Model B: As derived before, the PASSV and ACTV schemes are the optimum passive and active detectors for the traffic model A. We show that PASSV and ACTV perform very poorly under the traffic model B, i.e., the correlated traffic. This is unlike the SLCorr detector that works well for both of the traffic models. Under the traffic model B, the PASSV detector faces the hypothesis testing problem of (47) with . One can see that in this case the PASSV detection rule described in Section IV-C.1 is exactly the same for both and hypotheses. This means that the false positive error rate of PASSV scheme for correlated flows is equal to its true positive rate, which makes the PASSV scheme equivalent to a random guessing detector. Similarly, for the traffic model B the ACTV scheme deals with the hypothesis testing problem of (52) with . Our analysis and simulations on Mathematica confirms that the ACTV detection metric results in very close values for the two hypothesis of and , rendering the ACTV detection scheme ineffective for network flows in traffic model B (we skip the details due to the space constraints). 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the three detection schemes introduced before, i.e., SLCorr, ACTV, and PASSV, through simulating them over real-world traffic. We show that SLCorr outperforms the other detectors dealing with real-world network flows due to the intrinsic correlations among the real-world network flows. We use the CAIDA network traces gathered in January 2009 [27] for our simulations. For our simulations, we have implemented the detection schemes in C++. From the CAIDA traces, we extract three types of network flows for our simulations: TCP ports of 443 (HTTPS), 25 (SMTP), and 22 (SSH). We only select flows with rates lower than 30 pps (this is because the parameters of the optimum detectors depend on the rate of the flows). In all of the simulations, the detectors use the detection thresholds derived through analysis in the previous sections, i.e., 0.001 for SLCorr, 0 for ACTV, and 0 for PASSV.
In the first set of our simulations, we evaluate the false positive error rate of the three detection schemes for network flows mentioned above. For each detection scheme, we run the detection algorithm for 10 000 different pairs of network flows. In order to show the effect of number of packets in the detection performance, we run the experiments for four different values of the parameter, i.e., 25, 50, 100, and 200. Tables I-III show (Tables I-III) , we observe that the ACTV and PASSV schemes perform the worst for the SSH traffic (TCP port 22); we explain this by the fact that SSH flows are more correlated compared to HTTPS and SMTP flows, as they are based on the typing behaviors of the human entities. Another general observation from the simulations is that the detection performance improves as the number of packets, , increases.
In the second set of experiments, we run the simulated detection schemes to measure the false negative error rates. Again, we use the detection thresholds derived through the analysis in previous sections. In each simulation of the SLCorr and ACTV schemes, the candidate network flow is watermarked using the RAINBOW scheme (Section III), and then a network delay is randomly selected and applied to that flow from a large pool of network delays measured over the Planetlab infrastructure [20] (the average standard deviation of the network delay is around 10 ms). Likewise, for the PASSV simulations, the candidate network flow is delayed similarly to simulate the network interference. The delayed flow is then correlated with the original flow (nondelayed and nonwatermarked) using each of the detection schemes. Tables IV-VI show the false negative of the experiments for the three different detection schemes, evaluated for three different TCP ports. For the watermark detection schemes of SLCorr and ACTV, the experiments are repeated for four different values of the watermark amplitude, i.e., ms. Also, all of the simulations are run for different values of the watermark length . Results show that by choosing reasonable parameters for the RAINBOW watermark, the SLCorr and ACTV detection schemes result in very small false negative rates, comparable to those of the passive detection. Again, we see that increasing improves the detection performance.
In the third set of experiments, we evaluate the false positive error rate of the three detection schemes over highly correlated network flows. More specifically, we use flow traces corresponding to Web browsing activities of human entities that target the same destination Web sites at different times and from different network locations. 3 Table VII shows the false positive error rates for different detection schemes for different Web sites and for different values of (each simulation is averaged 3 The traces are generated and provided to us by X. Gong from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA. over 100 runs). As can be seen, in most of the cases, the ACTV and PASSV detection schemes result in very high false positive rates, while the SLCorr scheme results in no false positive error in all of the cases. This confirms what we expect intuitively: The PASSV and ACTV schemes are optimum passive and active detection schemes for independent network traffic models, but they perform poorly as the network flows get more correlated. The SLCorr scheme, however, is the optimum detection scheme for correlated network flows, and it also performs good enough in the case of independent network flows.
VI. OTHER WATERMARK PROPERTIES

A. Invisibility
The pioneering designs for flow watermarking [6]- [9] fail to provide invisibility due to their use of large packet delays. Examples of attacks against these schemes include [16] and [17] . This motivated the design of new generation of schemes such as RAINBOW [10] , Swirl [11] , and [28] , which work by inserting smaller delay values. In particular, RAINBOW's invisibility was studied in several recent works [10] , [18] , [19] . More specifically, Houmansadr et al. [10] use several statistical tools to analyze RAINBOW's invisibility for different values of watermarking parameters. More recently, Lin et al. [19] analyzed watermark invisibility for several flow watermarking schemes, including RAINBOW; they showed that an improper use of watermarking parameters, e.g., large watermark amplitudes, can give away the presence of the watermark. Another analysis was provided by Luo et al. [18] , where the performance of the scheme was tested against BACKLIT. The authors show that when a watermark is applied only on one side of a TCP connection, it can be detected. To fix this, a watermark should be adapted to be applied on both sides of a connection if the carrying transport protocol is TCP.
B. Robustness to Packet Modifications
A practical watermark detector should withstand packet additions and removals. In [10] , we showed that RAINBOW resists packet additions/removals up to 20% of the flow length. This is achieved by adding a preprocessing step at the decoder, known as the matching step. We refer the interested reader to [10] for more details.
C. Robustness to Active Attacks
We note that active robustness and invisibility are likely to be impossible to achieve simultaneously. This is because to be invisible, a watermarking scheme must introduce small changes to the packet stream. In particular, it cannot introduce jitters exceeding a few milliseconds, as otherwise it would stand apart from the natural network jitter. On the other hand, an active attacker may be willing to introduce large delays, for example 500 ms as suggested in previous work, hence practically wiping out the watermark. Furthermore, it is easy to imagine an attacker determined to hide his tracks using even more drastic measures, such as inserting dummy packets to generate a completely independent Poisson process [4] , which will render any linking techniques ineffective. As such, RAINBOW is designed to detect stepping stones when the attackers is unwilling (or unable) to actively distort his stream as it crosses a stepping stone. Furthermore, as the watermark is invisible, the attacker will not be able to tell that he is being traced and, thus, will be less likely applying costly watermark countermeasures.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the first non-blind active traffic analysis scheme, RAINBOW. Using the tools from the detection and estimation theory, we find the optimum passive and (non-blind) active traffic analysis schemes for different types of the network flows. We show that, for different traffic models, the optimum active detectors outperform the optimum passive detectors. This advantage is more significant for the more correlated network traffic, e.g., the Web browsing traffic. Considering the fact that both passive and non-blind active approaches of traffic analysis are constrained by similar scalability issues, this finding motivated the use of non-blind active approaches over the passive approaches.
APPENDIX CHERNOFF BOUNDS
Lemma 1 (Chernoff Bound for Signal Detection):
Consider the following binary hypothesis testing for signal detection:
(101) For this hypothesis testing, consider a detection scheme with rule such that . We are interested in finding the false positive rate and the false negative rate of this detector in different cases. We have that [21] : a) General case: 
